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21 Introduction
In their seminal contribution, Kiyotaki and Moore [7] (KM henceforth) have shown
that credit cycles occur when collateral constraints interact with lumpy investment.
In addition, they have also emphasized that such an interplay originates an amplification-
persistence trade-oﬀ. The reason why this trade-oﬀ occurs is intuitively simple: col-
lateralized borrowing amplifies shocks only if the proportion of credit-constrained
firms is large enough, that is, only if the probability of investment opportunity is
large enough. Persistence, on the contrary, requires the fraction of non-investing
firms to be large enough. Not surprisingly, this is tantamount to the eﬀect of non-
adjusting firms in sticky-price models, in which more persistence arises if the fraction
of inertial firms in the economy is larger.
Such a trade-oﬀ arguably casts some doubts on the quantitative importance of
collateral constraints. For example, this trade-oﬀ dictates that credit constraints
amplify shocks to total factor productivity (TFP henceforth) for some parameter
values, but that persistence is typically small for such parameter constellations. In
other words, the possibly large eﬀects of shocks at impact are bound to be short-
lived. Conversely, large persistence of the impact of shocks is associated with small
amplification. KM [6] and [7] emphasize that their assumption of lumpy investment
is essential to the occurrence of such a rather disappointing trade-oﬀ. Therefore, an
open question is whether substituting neo-classical input accumulation for lumpy in-
vestment in an economy with collateral constraints rules out the trade-oﬀ. Although
3KM touch upon this issue, they do so in a setting that relies on some specific and
questionable assumptions. For example, KM assume that the utility and production
functions are linear and that the interest rate is exogenous. As a consequence, one is
left wondering what is the exact role played by these ingredients, as opposed to the
collateral constraints, in the amplification-persistence trade-oﬀ.
The main purpose of this paper is to shed some light on the answer to this ques-
tion, by way of a simple example. I study a general-equilibrium version of a two-agent
economy that incorporates collateral constraints and neo-classical capital accumula-
tion. The interest of such a framework is that it is as close as possible to a benchmark
business-cycle model, while retaining KM’s collateral constraints. Therefore, ampli-
fication and propagation can be entirely attributed to credit market frictions a` la
KM. The most important lesson one draws from examining the impulse-response
functions of such a model is that the trade-oﬀ originated in KM’s model does not
survive: amplification and persistence of the impact of shocks turn out to go hand
in hand. In particular, increasing the relative risk aversion on the borrower’s side
not only magnifies the amplification of a temporary, unexpected and serially uncor-
related TFP shock in the period following impact. This also enlarges the persistence
of the impact of the TFP shock. The intuition for why the trade-oﬀ disappears, as
developed in Section 3, is that the larger risk aversion and consumption smoothing,
the more pronounced amplification and persistence.
This paper is, of course, not the first to discuss how shocks propagate in economies
with collateral constraints. Among others, Kocherlakota [8] works out an open-
4economy model which exhibits a similar trade-oﬀ but relies on an exogenous interest
rate, just as KM’s. Cordoba and Ripoll [3] study a model that shares many simi-
larities with the setting considered in this paper. However, these authors introduce
reproducible land but not reproducible capital, so that their model is less comparable
to KM’s than the setting considered in this paper.
In Section 2, the amplification-persistence trade-oﬀ is restated and discussed. The
main result of this paper is developed in Section 3, where I study an extended version
of KM’s model with concave preferences and technology. In Section 4, I state some
concluding remarks and conjectures while the final appendix collects some proofs.
2 The Amplification-Persistence Trade-oﬀ in the
Kiyotaki-Moore Economy: A Restatement
This section is devoted to restating and discussing the amplification-persistence
trade-oﬀ that arises in the full model with credit-constrained investment by hetero-
geneous firms of KM [7, Section III]. The economy is composed of borrowers-farmers
that are supposed to be less patient than lenders-gatherers. Among the borrowers,
a fraction 1 ≥ π ≥ 0 receives an investment opportunity and is credit-constrained
while the remaining fraction 1− π cannot invest and therefore scales down its scale
of operation because capital depreciates. To save space, I simply recall the following
definition stating the three main equations that drive the dynamics of the economy.
5Details on the derivation are found in KM [7, pp. 215-233].
Definition 2.1 (Competitive Equilibrium)
An intertemporal competitive equilibrium with perfect foresight is a sequence of pos-
itive land stock, debt stock and land price (Lt, Bt, Qt), for all t ≥ 0, such that, given
some initial values L0, B0 > 0:
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Lt+1 = (1− π)λLt + π[(a+Qt+1 + λφ)Lt −RBt]/[φ+ u(Lt+1)]
Bt+1 = RBt +Qt+1(Lt+1 − Lt) + φ(Lt+1 − λLt)− aLt
Qt+1 = R[Qt − u(Lt)]
(1)
where u(L) ≡ GI[(L− L)/m]/R denotes the user’s cost of holding land.
In eqs. (1) (which correspond to KM’s [7] eqs. (23)-(24) and (12), respectively), L
is the (constant) stock of land supply to be shared among farmers and gatherers, L
is the stock of farmers’ land, B is the stock of farmers’ debt, Q is the land price (per
unit of fruit, the nume´raire), R > 1 is the constant gross interest rate, m > 0 is the
proportion of gatherers, 1 ≥ 1−λ ≥ 0 is the rate of tree depreciation. The remaining
parameters are a ≥ 0, the productivity level of farmers’ technology, and φ ≥ 0, the
unit cost of investing in trees.
The last equation in (1) expresses equilibrium on the land market, as it equates the
marginal product of land u(Lt) to the user’s cost of holding land Qt −Qt+1/R. The
second equality in (1) is the borrowers’ budget constraint: tomorrow’s debt stock
6results from the excess over tradable output of debt repayment from the previous
period, land investment, and investment in trees. Finally, the first equation in (1) is
the law of capital accumulation: tomorrow’s land stock comes from the addition of
the undepreciated stock from the fraction 1− π of non-investing farmers and of the
land stock provided by the fraction π of investing farmers.
KM [7, p. 233] show that eqs. (1) have a unique interior steady state (L∗, B∗, Q∗)
such that the collateral constraint is binding for investing farmers (although not for
non-investing farmers), provided that the following restrictions on the parameters are
imposed:
Assumption 2.1
The following restrictions on parameters are assumed:
a > φ(1− λ), π > 1− 1/R, (2)
c > (1/β − 1)(a+ φ)[1− βRλ(1− π)]/[βR(λπ + (1− λ)(1−R+ πR))], (3)
where c > 0 determines bruised output cK. In (2)-(3), the inequalities respectively
ensure that there is enough tradable output to replace the depreciated trees, that
the probability of investment is not too small, and that the return from farming
is large enough that all tradable production is used for investment. In addition,
exploding bubbles are ruled out by the usual “no-Ponzi game condition”, that is
lims→∞Et(R
−sQt+s) = 0.
7The main goal of this section is to restate and discuss the amplification-persistence
trade-oﬀ that emerges from the model. The main parameter of interest is π, the
fraction of credit-constrained farmers. As acknowledged by KM [6, Section 4], het-
erogeneity is an essential element of the model to get credit cycles, whereas trees are
not. In other words, credit cycles require π < 1 while they do occur even if φ = 0
(so that only investment in land, not in trees, is allowed). As the analytics is quite
cumbersome when both π < 1 and φ > 0 and because trees are not essential for KM’s
main result while heterogeneity certainly is, I state the next proposition under the
assumption that π < 1 and φ = 0. However, KM [7, pp. 236-8] discuss some numer-
ical examples that confirm the robustness of the amplification-persistence trade-oﬀ
when φ > 0.
A first step is to linearize eqs. (1) at (L∗, B∗, Q∗) (see the appendix in KM [6] for
some details of the derivation), which delivers that R > 1 is an (unstable) eigen-
value while the remaining eigenvalues are the roots of the second-order polynomial
p(x) = x2 − Tx+D, with:
D = ηλR(1− π)/(η + 1− λ+ λπ),
T = D + [η +R(1− π)(1− λ)]/(η + 1− λ+ λπ),
(4)
where η > 0 is the elasticity of the residual supply of land to the farmers with respect
to the user’s cost, evaluated at steady state (see KM [7, p. 225]). Notice that if the
period is interpreted as being short (say, a quarter), then R is close to one and,
therefore, the unstable eigenvalue is close to unit root. Therefore, the steady state is
a saddle if the two remaining eigenvalues are stable, as there are two predetermined
8variables in eqs. (1), namely the stocks L and B, while the land price Q is a jump
variable. As I now show, the two roots of the polynomial in (4) are stable under the
maintained assumptions.
Proposition 2.1 (Saddle-Point Stability of the Steady State)
Under Assumption 2.1 and φ = 0, the steady state (L∗, B∗, Q∗) of eqs. (1) is locally
a saddle (hence determinate).
Proof: See Appendix A.
In a previous version of this paper, Pintus [10], I show that when the conditions of
the previous proposition are relaxed, then the steady state may undergo a Hopf bifur-
cation when π goes through a critical value that is typically small. As a consequence,
endogenous cycles may surround the steady state. To save space, the interested
reader is referred to the earlier version for details on local bifurcations occurring in
the KM model.
I am now ready to restate the amplification-persistence trade-oﬀ. From the details
contained in the proof of Proposition 2.1, one gets that the two stable roots of p(x)
are complex provided that π is not too close to one. As already shown by KM [7,
p. 234], heterogeneity leads to a linearized model that is AR(2) and it is necessary
for credit cycles to occur. In the sequel, I focus on the configuration where p(x) has
complex roots. Persistence is defined as the modulus of the complex eigenvalues, that
is,
√
D. Alternatively, following KM, persistence is inversely measured by the decay
9rate μ ≡ 1−
√
D. In Proposition 2.1, the steady state is a saddle that possesses one
unstable eigenvalue (that is, R > 1) and two eigenvalues lying inside the unit circle.
Therefore, the requirement that lims→∞Et(R
−sQt+s) = 0 for all t ≥ 1 ruling out
exploding bubbles implies that the dynamics are restricted to the stable manifold
of the saddle, where they exhibit damped oscillations that decay at rate μ. Then
persistence is “maximal” when complex unit roots occur, that is, when D = 1 or,
equivalently, μ = 0. On the other hand, amplification is measured by the deviation
from steady state occurring after a one-period productivity shock hits the economy,
while it is at steady state. For example, let ∆ denote the (small) initial productivity
shock, in percentage terms, and let Yˆ ≡ (Y − Y ∗)/Y ∗ define the next-period devia-
tion of output from steady state, where Y ∗ is steady state output. Then the output
amplification is Yˆ /∆. Analogous definitions hold for the amplification of land price,
Qˆ, and of land stock Lˆ.
Theorem 2.1 (The Amplification-Persistence Trade-oﬀ)
Under the assumptions of Proposition 2.1, assume that the polynomial in eqs. (4)
has complex roots and that the depreciation rate of trees is close enough to zero (that
is, λ is close enough to one). Then the dynamics of eqs. (1) near the steady state
are such that both the decay rate and the amplification of a temporary, unexpected
productivity shock on capital and output increase when π goes up.
In other words, there exists an amplification-persistence trade-oﬀ.
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Proof: See Appendix B.
The intuitive discussion of the main mechanisms at work provided by KM empha-
sizes that the trade-oﬀ is linked to the assumption of lumpy investment. This can
be seen by supposing a positive TFP shock and recalling that only a fraction π of
farmers faces an investment opportunity each period and can react to such a distur-
bance. As a consequence, the higher π, the larger the amplification of the impact
of the temporary shock: the larger π, the larger the increase of demand for land
from farmers that is accommodated by gatherers, the higher the increase in the land
price, and the more relaxed the credit constraint is. Hence, the larger the increases
in land reallocation, investment and output. On the other hand, when the fraction
of investing firms is large, then the endogenous persistence of the shock impact turns
out to be low, because almost all farmers increase their scale of operation through
borrowing and investment while only a small fraction leaves their stock of cultivated
land almost constant (if, plausibly, the rate of tree depreciation is small).1 In sum-
mary, the key point behind this trade-oﬀ is that persistence requires the fraction of
credit-constrained firms to be small enough, so that a low fraction of farmers invest
in each period, while high amplification relies on just the opposite condition, as it
occurs only when there are many credit-constrained firms. This is similar to the
eﬀect of non-adjusting firms in sticky-price models, in which persistence is larger if
the fraction of inertial firms in the economy is large enough.
1More technically, direct examination of eqs. (1) reveals that persistence in the dynamics of the
farmers’ stock of land is large when both λ is close to one and π is close to zero.
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Theorem 2.1 focuses on investment heterogeneity, through the parameter π, be-
cause this feature is key to obtain credit cycles, as shown by KM. However, varying
other parameters also reveals the amplification-persistence trade-oﬀ. In particular, it
is not diﬃcult to show that persistence is an increasing function - while amplification
is a decreasing function - of η, φ and R. Here again, the trade-oﬀ manifests itself.
For example, the intuition shedding light on the eﬀects of η is as follows. Remember
that η is the elasticity of the residual supply of land to the farmers with respect to
the user’s cost. When a positive TFP shock hits the economy, the user’s cost of
holding land increases, which partly attenuates the increase in investment following
the shock. Therefore with a large η is associated a small amplification. On the other
hand, large η’s imply large persistence. It is useful to think about the limiting case
in which η is infinite: in this configuration, the land price does not move after the
shock and therefore there is less amplification, but persistence is complete because
land reallocation from gatherers to farmers becomes permanent.
3 Is the Amplification-Persistence Trade-oﬀ Ro-
bust?
The answer provided by this section is ’No’. Given the auxiliary assumptions made
by KM, one is left wondering to what extent the deceptive amplification-persistence
trade-oﬀ is due to collateral constraints. In particular, credit cycles are shown by KM
12
to occur under the assumptions both that investment is lumpy and that the utility
and production functions are linear, implying that the interest rate is exogenous.
What is the exact role played by these ingredients, versus the collateral constraints,
in the amplification-persistence trade-oﬀ? To answer this question, this section stud-
ies a general-equilibrium version of KM’s model with neo-classical capital and land
accumulation. The interest of such a framework is that it is as close as possible to the
standard business-cycle model: it relies on concave technologies, it endogenizes the
interest rate and, finally, it abstracts from lumpy investment and introduces instead
neo-classical input accumulation. The main lesson from this section is that with con-
ventional input accumulation and convex preferences and technology, amplification
and persistence turn out to go hand in hand under collateral constraints. Therefore,
the amplification-persistence seems indeed specific to KM’s setting and in particular
to the assumption of lumpy investment.
The economy is composed of lenders and borrowers, both producing goods by using
land, capital and fixed labor. Lenders provide one-period loans to borrowers. Credit
can be used to finance consumption and investment. Lenders hold both land and
capital and use output proceeds and interest income from previous loans to finance
consumption and investment. The budget constraint of a representative lender is
given by
C˜t +Qt(L˜t+1 − L˜t) + K˜t+1 − (1− δ)K˜t +Bt+1 = (1 +Rt)Bt + Y˜t, (5)
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where C˜t is consumption, L˜t is the amount of land owned by the lender in the begin-
ning of period t, Qt is the relative price of land in terms of the produced good, K˜t+1
and Bt+1 are respectively the lender’s capital stock and the amount of new loans
generated in period t, Y˜t is lender’s output, and Rt is the real interest factor while
δ ∈ (0, 1) is the depreciation rate of capital. The lender maximizes the discounted
value of utility streams
∞3
t=0
β˜t
C˜1−σ˜
1− σ˜ , (6)
where the time discounting factor is β˜ ∈ (0, 1) while σ˜ ≥ 0 measures relative risk
aversion. The production technology available to the lender is given by
Y˜t = AK˜
α˜
t L
γ˜
t , (7)
where α˜, γ˜ ∈ (0, 1), α˜+ γ˜ < 1, and A is TFP.
Similarly, the representative borrower’s production technology is given by
Yt = AK
α
t L
γ
t , (8)
where α, γ ∈ (0, 1), α+ γ < 1, L is the amount of land owned by the borrower, and
K denotes his capital stock. The total amount of land is in fixed supply, that is,
Lt + L˜t = L¯, (9)
where L¯ is a positive number. A representative borrower in each period needs to
finance consumption, land investment, capital investment, and loan payment. The
budget constraint of the borrower is given by
Ct +Qt(Lt+1 − Lt) +Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt + (1 +Rt)Bt = Bt+1 + Yt. (10)
14
The representative borrower maximizes
∞3
t=0
βt
Ct
1−σ
1− σ , (11)
with σ ≥ 0. As in KM, borrowers are assumed to be more impatient than lenders,
that is, β < β˜.
The borrowing constraint faced by the borrower is, as in KM,
θQt+1Lt+1 ≥ (1 +Rt+1)Bt+1, (12)
where θ ∈ (0, 1] measures the collateral value of land.2 While KM assume θ = 1, I
discuss below the consequences of setting θ < 1.
Definition 3.1 (Competitive Equilibrium)
An intertemporal competitive equilibrium with perfect foresight is a sequence of
positive prices {Qt, Rt}∞t=0 and positive allocations
+
Ct, C˜t, K˜t+1, Kt+1, Lt+1, L˜t+1
∞
t=0
such that:
(i)
+
Ct, C˜t, K˜t+1, Kt+1, Lt+1, L˜t+1
∞
t=0
maximizes both (6) subject to (5) and (11) sub-
ject to (10)-(12), and satisfies the transversality conditions limt→∞ βtΛtLt+1 = 0,
limt→∞ βtΛtKt+1 = 0, limt→∞ β˜tΛ˜tL˜t+1 = 0, limt→∞ β˜tΛ˜tK˜t = 0, and the com-
plementarity slackness condition, Φt [θQtLt − (1 +Rt)Bt] = 0 for all t ≥ 0, given
{Qt, Rt}∞t=0 and the initial endowments L0 ≥ 0, L˜0 ≥ 0, B0 ≥ 0, K0 ≥ 0, K˜0 ≥ 0;
2Introducing also non-depreciated capital as collateral turns out not to aﬀect the main conclusion
of this section.
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(ii) The good and asset markets clear for all t ≥ 0, Ct + C˜t + Kt+1 − (1 − δ)Kt +
K˜t+1 − (1− δ)K˜t = Yt + Y˜t and Lt + L˜t = L¯, respectively.
The first-order conditions associated with condition (i) of Definition 3.1 are stated
in Appendix C. It is rather straightforward to show that the model has a unique sta-
tionary competitive equilibrium in which the borrower is credit-constrained so that
condition (12) binds. So as to examine the quantitative implications of collateral
constraints, the next step is to linearize the model around the steady state and to de-
rive its impulse responses to a temporary, unexpected and serially-uncorrelated shock
to TFP. More precisely, the following figures graph the responses of the linearized
first-order conditions stated in Appendix C to a ∆% deviation of A from its steady
state value. So as to parallel the discussion in Section 2 devoted to the KM model,
the strategy is to assign numerical values to all parameters, except σ and θ for which
several levels are considered. More precisely, the idea is to show, by varying each
parameter one by one, that the amplification-persistence does not necessarily hold.
In all cases presented below, the period is a quarter. I set the capital and land
shares equal to γ = γ˜ = α = α˜ = 0.2. In other words, capital and land are equally
important in the production of goods while labor accounts for 60% of income. The
rate of capital depreciation is set at δ = 0.025. The lender’s rate of time discount
equals β˜ = 0.99 (which implies an annual interest rate of 4%), whereas the impa-
tient borrower discounts future utility streams using β = 0.8β˜. Borrowers hold 10%
of the land stock in steady state. Robustness analysis indicates that similar results
16
hold when one slightly changes the above parameter values. As a benchmark, the
lender’s risk aversion is set to the conventional value σ˜ = 1, while the borrower’s
risk aversion is fixed at either σ = 1 or σ = 10. Such values belong to the range of
parameter estimates obtained from micro-data (see e.g. Chiappori and Paiella [2]).
On the other hand, the parameter controlling the tightness of the credit constraints
takes two values: θ = 1 (in which case the full market value of the borrower’s land
stock is accepted as collateral by the lender) or θ = 0.1 (so that borrowing is limited
to 10% of the land market value).
Two reasons account for my focusing on these two parameters. First, σ determines
the demand for credit emanating from the borrower-producer. In that sense, it plays
a similar role to π in the KM model studied in Section 2: the higher the borrower’s
relative risk aversion, the larger the increase in desired borrowing in the face of an
unexpected TFP shock, for the usual insurance motive. Second, it is interesting to
examine the impact of tightening the credit constraint, by lowering θ. One thought
experiment associated with such a decline in θ would be to try to figure out the
impact of a contract clause that protects the borrowers by restricting the lender’s
claim to a fraction of - as opposed to the full - market value of the collateral in case
of default. In other words, θ < 1 is interpreted as limited liability on the borrower’s
side. Alternatively, a lower θ could reflect some administrative costs that plague the
imperfect recollection of the debt by the creditors. Cases (1a) and (1b): figures 1-2
depict the impulse responses of the borrower’s debt, capital and land stocks and of
land price, respectively when σ = 1 - case (1a) - and σ = 10 - case (1b) - while θ = 1
17
in both. These variables (except capital) also appear in the simulations provided
by KM [7, p. 238] so that their figure 3 and the figures below may be directly com-
pared. Contrasting figures 1 and 2 clearly reveals that amplification and persistence
go and in hand. In other words, the trade-oﬀ featured in the KM economy does not
occur. For example, the responses in period 2 of borrower’s debt and land stocks
increase respectively from 0.35% and 0.27% in figure 1 to 0.45% and 0.35% in figure
2. Similarly, the borrower’s capital stock goes from a little less than 0.8% to 1.0%.
Unambiguously, increasing the borrower’s relative risk aversion magnifies the eﬀect
of the TFP shock in the period following impact. On the other hand, persistence
also is higher in figure 2 than in figure 1. For instance, the half-life persistence3 of
the TFP shock on borrower’s debt is 6 quarters in figure 1 and 14 quarters in figure
2, and it is higher for the other variables as well in figure 2. Notice that although
the numbers in both figures seem small, they are not relative to what happens in a
first-best environment, in which the impact of the TFP would vanish from period 2
thereafter (as shown by KM). In addition, the numbers in figures 1-2 are 2 order of
magnitudes larger than the amplification levels reported in figure 3 of KM [7, p. 238].
The intuition of why there is no amplification-persistence trade-oﬀ here may be
stated as follows. In contrast to the KM’s economy, borrowers are risk-averse and
use borrowing to smooth the impact of shocks on their consumption. Intuitively, one
therefore expects that the larger their relative risk aversion σ, the larger amplification
3The half-life persistence of a shock indicates how long it takes for the initial impact of the shock
to dissipate by half.
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of the impact of the TFP shock: following a 1% shock to TFP A in period 1, the re-
sponses of the borrower’s debt stock, land stock, and land price in period 2 should be
larger for larger σ’s. This is confirmed in the numerical examples graphed in figures
1-2. In that sense, large σ’s in my economy have the same eﬀect on the amplification
of the shock impact as large π’s in KM’s. However, what diﬀers dramatically is the
eﬀect of both parameters on persistence: with large risk aversion, the mere desire
of consumption smoothing also implies high persistence. After impact, the eﬀects of
the TFP shock tend to exhibit more persistence when risk aversion is larger because
debt, land, and capital return more slowly to their steady-state levels. On the con-
trary, recall that such inertia of non-investing farmers arises only if the fraction of
credit-constrained firms is small enough, which inevitably entails small amplification.
Cases (2a) and (2b): figures 3-4 graph the impulse responses respectively when
σ = 1 - case (2a) - and σ = 10 - case (2b) - while θ = 0.1 in both. Comparing both
figures confirms again the absence of a trade-oﬀ between amplification and persis-
tence of the impact of the TFP shock in period 1. When only 10% of the market
value of land is accepted as collateral by the lender, amplification and persistence still
move together for the very same reason of consumption smoothing. Note that the
land price is more volatile when θ = 0.1: with tighter credit constraints, fluctuations
in the price of collateral tend to be more pronounced.
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4 Conclusion
I have restated and discussed the amplification-persistence trade-oﬀ that arises
in the model of Kiyotaki and Moore [7]. The key point behind this trade-oﬀ is that
persistence of temporary productivity shocks at impact requires the fraction of credit-
constrained firms to be small enough, so that a low fraction of farmers invest in each
period. However, large amplification relies on just the opposite condition, as it is
substantial only when there are many credit-constrained firms. The main result of
this paper is to show by way of an example that such a trade-oﬀ does not extend
to a general-equilibrium two-agent model that dispenses with several unorthodox as-
sumptions made by Kiyotaki and Moore [7]. In particular, the benchmark model,
featuring concave utility and production functions and neo-classical input accumu-
lation, does not predict an amplification-persistence trade-oﬀ to occur because of
collateral constraints. Although the model is arguably standard in many dimensions
(it is indeed similar to Cordoba and Ripoll’s [3]), it remains to be seen if the same
conclusion stands in alternative settings with diﬀerent credit market frictions.
Although this paper confirms some existing results and conjectures, it also calls
for further research. The main lesson learned from the contribution by Cordoba and
Ripoll [3] remains valid here: when capital accumulation and fractional collateral
are added to the analysis, collateral constraints still have small quantitative eﬀects,
especially on aggregate output.4 However, this fact does not imply that collateral
4It is expected that introducing elastic labor would improve output amplification.
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constraints are quantitatively insignificant. As a matter of fact, this conclusion re-
inforces the importance of a major conjecture of Kiyotaki and Moore [7]: collateral
constraints may have significant eﬀects when interacted with other economic mecha-
nisms, such as lumpy investment. Along that line, Pintus and Wen [11] study a model
in which the interplay of collateral constraints and habit formation lead to credit cy-
cles but rule out the amplification-persistence trade-oﬀ. In view of this example, it
seems worthwhile to extend the research program pointed out by Kocherlakota [8]
by acknowledging that a major challenge is to identify which interactions involving
credit constraints, if any, have a prominent role in business-cycle theory.
A Proof of Proposition 2.1
From Kiyotaki and Moore [6, p. 33], one gets the expression of the characteristic
polynomial associated with the Jacobian of eqs. (1), that is, P (x) = (x − R)p(x),
where p(x) = x2 − Tx+D and, under the additional requirement that φ = 0:
D = ηλR(1− π)/(η + 1− λ+ λπ),
T = D + [η +R(1− π)(1− λ)]/(η + 1− λ+ λπ).
(13)
Therefore, R > 1 is an unstable eigenvalue, while the other two are stable under
the maintained assumptions, as I now show. A straightforward way to proceed is
25
analyzing how T and D vary when π is decreased from one. That is, define:
D(π) ≡ ηλR(1− π)/(η + 1− λ+ λπ) > 0,
T (π) ≡ D(π) + [η +R(1− π)(1− λ)]/(η + 1− λ+ λπ) > 0,
(14)
where η > 0. One easily gets that D(π) is a strictly decreasing function of π, with
D(1) = 0. On the other hand, 0 < T (π) < 1 + D(π) for all π in the range allowed
by Assumption 2.1. Therefore, local saddle-point stability is ensured provided that
D(0) < 1. Several cases have to be considered.
(i) If λR < 1, then it is easy to show that D(0) = ηλR/(η + 1 − λ) < 1. In that
case, p(x) has two stable roots and the steady state is a saddle under Assumption
2.1.
(ii) If λR > 1, then two subcases arise, depending on whether η is smaller or larger
than (1−λ)/(λR−1). If η < (1−λ)/(λR−1), then D(0) < 1. If η > (1−λ)/(λR−1),
then there exists a critical value πH ≡ (λ(ηR + 1) − 1 − η)/[λ(1 + ηR)] such that
D(πH) ≡ 1 and D(0) < 1 if and only if π > πH . It turns out that πH < 1− 1/R so
that Assumption 2.1 rules out D(0) > 1. This proves that in both cases (i) and (ii),
p(x) has two stable roots and the steady state is a saddle under Assumption 2.1. -
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B Proof of Theorem 2.1
From the expressions in eqs. (4), one gets that the decay rate μ ≡ 1 −
√
D is an
increasing function of π, as
√
D, or to put it diﬀerently, persistence, is a decreasing
function of π. In particular, the decay rate increases from zero to one when π goes up
from πH to one. I now show that amplification of capital and output increases with π.
In Proposition 2.1, the steady state is a saddle that possesses one unstable eigenvalue
(that is, R > 1) and two eigenvalues lying inside the unit circle (that are complex
conjugate provided that π is not too close to one). Therefore, the requirement that
lims→∞Et(R
−sqt+s) = 0 for all t ≥ 1 ruling out exploding bubbles implies that the
dynamics are restricted to the stable manifold of the saddle. Denote by ∆ the (small)
unexpected, one-period productivity shock, measured in percentage terms, that hits
the economy while it is at steady state. On the other hand, denote by hatted variables,
the percentage deviation from steady state. For example, qˆ ≡ (q−q∗)/q∗ denotes the
current deviation of q, the land price, from its steady state value q∗. Then linearizing
eqs. (1) and restricting the analysis to the (linear) two-dimensional, stable manifold
allows one to derive the following expressions, when λ = 1:
qˆ/∆ = 1/η , Lˆ/∆ = π[η +R/(R− 1)]/(η + π). (15)
Moreover, output aggregated over farmers and non-farmers is given by Y = (a +
c)L + G(L − L). At steady state, one has Y ∗ = (a + c − Ra)L∗ + RaL. Therefore,
one has that Yˆ = Lˆ(a + c − Ra)/(a + c − Ra + RaL/L∗) < Lˆ. Collecting all facts,
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with λ = 1, one gets that:
Yˆ /∆ = π(a+ c−Ra)[η +R/(R− 1)]/[(η + π)(a+ c−Ra+RaL/L∗)]. (16)
Now it is straightforward to show, by using eqs. (15) that while qˆ/∆ is indepen-
dent of π, one has that d(Lˆ/∆)/dπ = η[η + R/(R − 1)]/(η + π)2 > 0. In other
words, capital amplification is an increasing function of π. Finally, noting that both
L (by assumption) and L∗ are independent of π, one concludes from eq. (16) and
the above finding that output amplification Yˆ /∆ is also an increasing function of
π. This completes the proof of the statement that there exists an amplification-
persistence trade-oﬀ, as persistence (resp. amplification) decreases (resp. increases)
when the share of credit-constrained farmers π goes up from πH to one. By conti-
nuity, the amplification-persistence trade-oﬀ remains valid when λ is close enough to
one, which is bound to be the only plausible configuration if the period is short (say,
a quarter). -
C Definition 3.1: First-Order Conditions
Denoting Λ˜ as the Lagrangian multiplier of the constraint (5), the first-order condi-
tions of the lender with respect to consumption, land, capital, and lending are given,
respectively, by
C˜−σ˜t = Λ˜t
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QtΛ˜t = β˜Qt+1Λ˜t+1 + β˜γ˜Λ˜t+1Y˜t+1/L˜t+1
Λ˜t = β˜Λ˜t+1(α˜Y˜t+1/K˜t+1 + 1− δ)
Λ˜t = β˜(1 +Rt+1)Λ˜t+1
Denoting {Λ,Φ} as the Lagrangian multipliers of constraints (10) and (12), respec-
tively, the first-order conditions of the borrower with respect to consumption, land,
capital, and borrowing are given, respectively, by
C−σt = Λt
QtΛt = βQt+1Λt+1 + βγΛt+1Yt+1/Lt+1 + θQt+1Φt
Λt = βΛt+1(αYt+1/Kt+1 + 1− δ)
Λt = β(1 +Rt+1)Λt+1 + (1 +Rt+1)Φt
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